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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the automobile industry of the most important
European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy) from a sectoral,
system perspective. The main relationships within and between the building blocks
constituting the automobile technological system are mapped and evaluated, both
in cross-sectional and in temporal terms. The importance of the sectoral TS as the
unit of our analysis appears evident at both levels. Some general sectoral proper-
ties emerge, which however hold in the four countries to a dierent extent, thus
suggesting how the institutional set-up works as a dierentiating element. A sus-
tained process of change in the various elements of the automobile TS is detected,
nevertheless resulting in a relatively stable path of development. The countries con-
sidered reveal dierent patterns of motor vehicles trade specialisation in dierent
geographical areas, with changes over time. Also foreign direct investments show
the existence of very dierent trajectories and outward/inward balances.
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1 Introduction
Although its meaning is not completely unambiguous, the concept of globalization seems to have
become nowadays a useful catchword to describe the present phase of high international inte-
gration (OECD, 1992). Not only has the volume of exchanges between countries increased, but
also new channels have been established to diuse goods, information and knowledge around
the world. This is also true with respect to technological change. The fact that innovation
can be produced and appropriated in locations other than those where rms reside, by ex-
ploiting a scientic knowledge base which spreads across countries, induces to think in terms
of `techno{globalism'. Simultaneously, the innovative relationships established within and be-
tween dierent economic sectors, either deliberately (i.e. in terms of technological transfers) or
naturally (i.e. in terms of spillovers), have largely increased.
These phenomena have raised the problem of how to study the structure of a certain industry
and its actual degree of `intersectoralisation' and `internationalisation'. In this paper we argue
that a sectoral interpretation of the concept of technological system (Carlsson and Stankiewicz,
1991) can be usefully adopted in pursuing this objective.
Indeed, the spatial and interindustrial extension of the techno-economic relationships that
make up for a technological system (TS) are two key elements in evaluating the structure of one
industry and the nature of the structural change it eventually undergoes along time. Further-
more, when it is accompanied by an institutional kind of analysis, the concept of sectoral TS
allows for the integration of the domain of the institutional set-up | that regulates, constrains
and stimulates the production and the innovation processes of the relative organisations (rms,
research institutes, associations, etc.) | with the relevant techno{economic relations within a
coherent framework.
The argument we put forward appears particularly relevant in the case of the automobile
industry. On the one hand, its `chain{value' appears to be one of the most interrelated, when
producer{users and producer{producer relationships are considered, and when the role of in-
stitutional regulations is clearly recognised, both as innovative constraints and as innovative
incentives. On the other hand, this sector is one in which international relationships are so
widespread to identify a truly transnational, if not even a global kind of TS.
This paper aims at empirically dening and evaluating the sectoral technological systems
of the automobile industry with respect to the most important European countries (France,
Germany, Great Britain and Italy). In particular, using data on production and innovation
intraindustry{intersectoral ows, along with data on bilateral trade and foreign direct invest-
ment, we will try to map the relevant relationships within the main building blocks constituting
the automobile TS. In so doing, we intend to furnish a novel viewpoint with which we will try
to make a direct appreciation of the phenomena linked to (or determining) the evolution of the
automobile industry, such as, for instance, the degree of decentralisation in production, at both
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national and international level, and the relevant user-producer linkages.
The paper is organised as follows. In paragraph 2 the extension of the automobile TS is
dened. Its peculiar dimensions are then analyised: the industrial structure and interactions
(Par. 3), the innovative activities (Par. 4), and the international relationships (Par. 5).
Paragraph 6 concludes.
2 The extension of the automobile technological system
As we said already said, in this paper we are interested neither in an industrial nor in a
organisational analysis of the automobile industry, for which there is abundance of literature.
We want instead to present a rather dierent angle from which to look at it. Indeed, what
we propose here is to analyse the automobile TS, which is constituted by the clustering of the
techno{economic activities of the relevant actors, and therefore is quite dierent in its extension
from the automobile sector itself.
The aim of this paragraph is to dene the domain of such a TS. The way we intend to do it is
by referring to the extent to which the automobile rms interact and enlarge their relationships
with other organisations of the economic system. Therefore, we will refer to the huge and varied
literature on the institutional analyses of techno{economic relationships which goes under the
main heading of national systems of innovation/technological systems (e.g. Lundvall, 1992;
Nelson, 1993; Carlsson, 1995; De Liso and Metcalfe, 1996; Edquist, 1997; Leoncini, 1998; etc.).
In particular we will consider, on the one hand, that part of the literature on technological
systems that refers to sectoral or industrial specications. This approach diers from others
that refer explicitly to the geographical extension of the set of institutions supporting, shaping
and determining the rate and direction of techno{economic activity (Lundvall, 1988, p. 10;
Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993, p. 3). Indeed, although the relevance of the institutional set-up
seems to `constrain' the vision of the system considered, and hence to force a national (or
regional) view of these kinds of relationships, a sectoral approach is also extremely relevant in
understanding technological change.
On the other hand, in our analysis we will also consider some other contributions which
refer to the importance of the clusterisation of techno{economic activities.
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Indeed, rms and
other institutional actors are linked by dierent kinds of interactions (such as, for example,
user-producer and input{output relations) and constitute networks which are reducible neither
to the industry nor to the nation level. Although both levels are liable to be appropriate
dimensions for an industry such as motor vehicles, whose actors are surely national champions,
it also true that they extend their eld of action in other industries too, both indise and outside
1
Such as Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991). See also, in another but related eld, Hughes (1989).
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their own countries.
2
Our starting point is therefore the idea that there exists a `sectoral' TS for the automobile
industry, which has an interindustrial dimension that is, for some aspects, bigger than that of
the nation, and for some other a smaller one. The denition of the boundaries of the automobile
TS thus becomes a very important issue and cannot be resolved with an ad hoc denition.
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Indeed, it is crucial in order to identify the domain within which the main institutional and
techno{economic relationships occur and should therefore be preliminary to the analysis of the
nature of the relevant actors and the kind of clustering they constitute.
In this paper, we will therefore try to determine the extension and the characteristics of
the automobile TS for France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy, by looking at three interre-
lated aspects: the type and intensity of the industrial relationships, the nature and the map
of the innovative interactions, and the structure and the direction of their international exten-
sion. Indeed, these are three important dimensions to understand how dierent institutional
arrangements among actors generate dierent techno{economic performances in the automobile
industry. This is possible essentially because this particular TS is constituted by few big actors
acting contemporarily at a supranational{regional level, but also with a relevant intra{national
focus as far as the main techno{economic activities are concerned.
3 The industry side
This paragraph is devoted to the analysis of the automobile TS from an industry perspective.
First, through data of general nature, we will briey sketch some features of its relative weight
within the European Union and of its structure (Paragraph 3.1). As the literature about this
topic has become really massive, the picture we provide is deliberately not very detailed. We
will rather focus on relational kind of aspects, for which the analysis is not yet fully developed.
More precisely, by means of input{output techniques, we intend to investigate the role of the
surrounding industrial set-up for the material acquisitions and diusions of the automobile
sector (Paragraph 3.2). In so doing, we will be able to infer and analyse how the dierent
institutional arrangements of the investigated countries are able to inuence the establishment
of dierent patterns of interactions among those actors which make up for its chain-value.
Preliminarily, it must be stressed that, both in the present and in the following sections
(4.2 and 4.3), our analysis has been constrained by the availability of comparable input{output
tables and innovation data for the four investigated countries. Some specic years and sectoral
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Obviously, there are not very clear cut distinctions, and, as Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991, p. 111) point
out, their notion of TS and that of NSI are due to nearly coincide if the TS is given a national dimension.
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These problems apply, though in a dierent way, also to national TS. See Leoncini and Montresor (1999a)
for an investigation of the extension of a group of national TS.
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disaggregations had therefore to be chosen. However, the structural nature of the relevant data
allows us to extend the relative results at least to a certain extent.
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3.1 General outlook
This section aims at giving a very brief and idiosyncratic picture of the European automobile
industry, with a particular emphasis on the four countries that are the focus of this paper
(France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy). As we have already said, we will limit ourselves
to a very general overview for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the literature on the
issue is really massive, and it is not our aim to replicate existing analyses. On the other
hand, the declared intent of this paper is quite circumscribed, as the focus is on relational (i.e.
interactive) aspects. Accordingly, at this stage, we will analyse few overall data, in order to
better understand which are the problems at stake in dealing with the kind of empirical analysis
we intend to pursue.
First, we will only consider ten European producers (BMW, Fiat, Ford, General Motors,
Mercedes, PSA, Renault, Saab, Volkswagen and Volvo) and exclude the other brands that they
own in dierent ways. Second, in this section we will consider only production in West{Europe
and leave out the volume of production made elsewhere by these ten producers. This is because
we are interested in the patterns of production that the big manufacturers implement in their
home country and in countries with comparable techno{economic conditions. Third, we will
mainly refer to some recent years for which we have suÆciently detailed data. In spite of these
caveats, some facts are quite relevant for our analysis.
Table 1: Motor vehicles production in the European Union
1995 1996 96/95 1997 97/96 1998 98/99
Cars 12,636,067 13,061,348 3.40% 13,451,272 3.00% 14,510,472 7.90%
Vans 1,318,462 1,393,245 5.70% 1,570,265 12.70% 1,675,315 6.70%
Trucks 348,577 310,204 -11.00% 334,562 7.90% 379,094 13.30%
Buses 30,519 32,001 4.90% 36,672 14.60% 35,397 -3.50%
Total 14,333,625 14,796,798 3.20% 15,392,771 4.00% 16,600,278 7.80%
A rst observation has to do with the large weight recently acquired by the sector in the
European market. Total production in the European Union shows an increase from almost
4
In the case of Italy, for example, comparable tables are only available at current prices, and for 1985
only. Moreover, in the case of Germany, dierently from the rest of the countries, the motor vehicles sector
comprehends also residual transports equipment.
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14 million vehicles in 1995 to 16 millions in 1998, with an increasing rate of change (Table
1). Indeed, although the production of cars has witnessed a doubling of its rate of change
in 1998, favourable elements have to be considered, such as the well known policies of State
aid to consumers (via scrapping schemes). Furthermore, let us observe that the extent of the
variations is dierent for dierent classes of vehicles, and that, for example, commercial vehicles
show more marked cyclical variations.
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Table 2: New car registrations in the European Union
Country 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998
Belgium 473.506 358.868 397.359 396.240 452.129
Denmark 80.654 135.773 142.430 152.084 159.773
France 2.309.130 1.930.504 2.132.091 1.713.030 1.943.553
Germany 3.349.788 3.314.057 3.496.320 3.528.179 3.735.987
Greece 115.480 125.023 139.821 159.867 180.145
Ireland 82.584 86.959 115.199 136.662 145.704
Italy 2.307.055 1.731.747 1.732.198 2.403.744 2.374.747
Luxemb. 38.422 28.029 29.980 31.418 35.928
The Neth. 502.627 447.942 471.989 478.290 543.067
Portugal 210.924 201.471 217.910 213.636 248.398
Spain 988.170 834.369 910.928 1.016.383 1.192.843
G. Britain 2.008.934 1.945.366 2.025.450 2.170.725 2.247.403
Austria 288.618 279.610 307.645 275.001 295.865
Finland 139.095 79.890 95.830 104.507 125.751
Sweden 229.941 169.756 183.820 225.263 253.430
Total 13.124.928 11.669.364 12.398.970 13.005.029 13.934.723
A second set of interesting observations comes from the analysis of the registrations of new
passenger cars in the EU (Table 2). Indeed, the four biggest markets (France, Germany, Great
Britain and Italy) accounts for around three quarter of the total registrations of new cars, with
a very slight decrease from 1990 (76%) to 1998 (74%). Their time patterns are however quite
dierent. In fact Germany and Great Britain show a steady increase over the last decade,
which is counterbalanced by the decrease of France and the substantial stability of Italy. In
interpreting these data, let us remember that these two countries have experienced, in dierent
5
In what follows, the terms motor vehicles and automobile sector will be meant as equivalent and used
interchangeably.
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times, State funded scrapping schemes which contributed to smooth the decline. Such a policy
worked better in Italy probably because of the older age of the car stock. Indeed, in 1997 new
car registrations in Italy increased by 38.8%, while one year before in France the increase was
`just' 10.4%. Spain is the only other European market to overcome the threshold of one million
new cars registered.
A third observation concerns the spatial concentration of car producers (Figure 1). Germany
(with around 5 million cars produced) and France (with slightly more than 2.5 million cars
produced) are the biggest producers, accounting for half of total European production. They are
followed by Spain (15%), which has only one national producer (Seat, owned by Volkswagen),
and by the other two big European producers, Italy and Great Britain, with almost the same
share (around 11%). Finally, Belgium is the rst largest producer (8.5%) with no national car
manufacturers.
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Figure 1: Car production in Europe by country (1995)
A nal aspect has to do with the geographical decentralisation of the sector. The data on
production by plant location (Figure 2), for example, show how almost all the car manufacturers
privilege their home nation for production, with percentages clearly higher than 50%. However,
some marked dierences emerge. Fiat Mercedes and Saab, for example, show the highest
percentages (above 80%). BMW has its production split almost equally between Germany and
Great Britain, due to the acquisition of Rover. Ford appears to be the only truly multinational
producer. In fact, having split its European operations equally among Germany and Great
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Britain, Ford has no `national home{base' from which to exploit particular techno{economic
advantages.
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Figure 2: Car production by plant location (1995)
According to these preliminary gures, therefore, contrasting evidence emerges with regard
to the role of globalization in shaping the main relationships within the automobile sector.
Hence, we will now dig a little deeper in order to better qualify the extension and main char-
acteristics of the automobile technological system.
3.2 Backward and forward linkages
An important aspect to be dealt with for a deeper industrial analysis of the automobile TS is
that of its material intersectoral relationships. Although limited to intermediate goods trans-
actions, backward and forward linkages indicators are extremely helpful in this respect. As
it is well known from the input{output analysis, these indicators measure the role that a cer-
tain sector has in stimulating the production of the other sectors, respectively, from a demand
(backward) and a supply (forward) perspective.
More precisely, the backward linkages indicators measure how important is a certain sector
in terms of what it acquires from the other sectors of the economy (i.e. they describe the
6
This picture is further conrmed if Volvo, which has recently been acquired, is also consolidated into the
Ford gures.
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material transactions of a sector with the rest of the economy from an input perspective). Two
backward linkages indicators are available: direct and total. The rst one accounts only for the
acquisitions made by one sector from the others to obtain its immediate inputs. Analytically, the
indicator of direct backward linkages (DBL) is given, for a generic sector j, by the correspondent
sum by column of the input coeÆcient matrix, A:
DBL
j
=
X
i
a
ij
where a
ij
is the generic element of A, dened as A = (X)(x^)
 1
, where X is the intersectoral
production matrix, while x^ is the diagonal vector of total sectoral output. Accordingly, 0 <
DBL
j
< 1.
The total backward linkages indicator (TBL) refers to both the direct and indirect acqui-
sitions (i.e. in subsequent production rounds) that a certain sector makes from the others.
Formally, for a generic sector j, it is given by the correspondent sum by column of the Leontief
inverse:
TBL
j
=
X
i

ij
where 
ij
is the generic element of the Leontief inverse, L, dened as L = (I A)
 1
, where I
is the identity matrix.
In addition to backward linkages, forward linkages indicators can also be dened, which
measure the role of a certain sector for the acquisitions of the others (i.e. they indicate how
important is a sector for the rest of the economy from an output perspective).
Similarly to the backward linkages indicators, also forward linkages ones can be either direct
or total. The former, which still refer to the output that a certain sector directly provides to
the others (DFL), is given by the sum by row of the output coeÆcient matrix, A

. For the
generic sector i, it is dened as:
DFL
i
=
X
j
a

ij
where a

ij
is the generic element of A

, dened as A

= (x^)
 1
(X):
The total forward linkages indicator (TFL), which again measures the importance of a
certain sector in terms of the output that it provides to the others, both directly and indirectly,
is given by the sum by row of the `output' Leontief inverse, L

. Analytically, for the generic
sector i it s given by:
TFL
i
=
X
j


ij
where 

ij
is the generic element of L

, in turn dened as L

= (I A

)
 1
:
Coming now to the calculation of the four indicators for the automobile sector of the coun-
tries considered (Table 3), some particular methodological choices have been made. The years
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of reference have been selected on the basis of the availability of comparable I{O tables (DSTI
(STAN, I{O), 1994). Their matching has brought us to work out the previous indicators with
respect to a 30 sectors disaggregation (see Appendix A.1).
Some of the facts we infer from the results are quite intuitive. For instance, being car
construction a scale intensive sector, the backward linkages indicators are systematically higher
than the forward linkages ones, both direct and total.
However, two interesting facts emerge. First of all, Germany and France, two countries
whose national TS can be shown to be the most connected of the four (Leoncini and Montresor,
1999b), are characterised by the highest values, in particular as far as the backward linkages
indicators are concerned. The motor vehicle sector, therefore, contributes to shape a more
systemic environment.
Table 3: Motor vehicles backward and forward linkages
Backward linkages Forward linkages
France 1972 1977 1980 1985 1990 1972 1977 1980 1985 1990
Direct 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Total 2.04 1.96 1.92 1.88 1.85 1.28 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.23
Total/Direct 3.78 3.77 3.76 3.76 3.85 6.40 6.89 6.83 6.83 6.83
Germany 1978 1986 1988 1990 1978 1986 1988 1990
Direct 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22
Total 2.02 2.03 2.04 1.98 1.32 1.33 1.32 1.30
Total/Direct 3.88 3.76 3.71 3.74 6.00 5.78 5.74 5.91
G. Britain 1968 1979 1984 1990 1968 1979 1984 1990
Direct 0.66 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.31 0.18 0.20 0.23
Total 2.42 1.80 1.69 1.78 1.49 1.28 1.30 1.38
Total/Direct 3.67 4.29 4.22 4.14 4.81 7.11 6.50 6.00
Italy 1985 1985
Direct 0.44 0.20
Total 1.78 1.25
Total/Direct 4.04 6.25
Second, the ratio between total and direct indicators is higher if evaluated for the forward
linkages than for the backward ones. This indicates that the present sector is characterised by
downstream relationships which are more complex and pervasive than the upstream ones. This
is more true for Italy, and more in general for Great Britain, where this ratio for the backward
linkages is the highest.
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Indeed, the British automobile TS seems to be the only one in which the sector reveals a
structural kind of change. The values of both types of indicators tend to decrease along time
(apart from the starting period), dierently from the other countries, where they remain more
or less stable. Dierent interpretations can of course be put forward to explain this evidence.
Among the others, the eects of an increase in the internationalisation degree of the same sector
along the considered period seems to be conrmed by the fact that the indicators are build up
on total matrices, including both internal and imported production.
4 The innovative side
Although the economic relationships we have previously observed are very important to identify
a TS, their innovative counterpart (i.e. the innovative sub{system) constitutes its core. Accord-
ingly, in this paragraph a thorough analysis of the innovative structure will be provided. First
of all, we will detail the main indicators of the innovative eorts of the automobile TS, that
is, their R&D expenditure and patenting activity. Subsequently, we will evaluate the techno{
economic interrelationships of the TS by analysing the innovative pervasivity and dependency
of the relative sector, and by mapping the network of their relative innovation ows.
4.1 R&D and patents
As it is well known, although with some caveats, R&D expenditure and patents can be utilised,
respectively, as input and output indicators of the innovative activity.
7
Accordingly, they allow
us to track down how the dierent arrangements of each TS are reected into its technological
performance, both in terms of incentives and eÆciency. Indeed, on the one side, the level of
R&D expenditure is likely to be correlated to the perceived market possibilities open to the
various rms. While the translation of purely technological activity into innovation, and hence
into eective techno{economic performances, can be approximated by the level of patenting
activity (e.g. by patents count).
As far as the R&D expenditure is concerned, we do not want to elaborate on well known
features of the innovative performances of the four TS investigated. On the contrary, as we
have already done for the industry side, we will highlight few idiosyncratic data in order to
show some peculiarities which are useful for our particular discussion.
At the outset, let us observe how, along the chosen period, the R&D expenditure in this
sector has substantially increased its weight in absolute terms. In particular, from 1973 to 1980
it has undergone a steady increase (DSTI (STAN, Anberd), 1994). If 1973 is made equal to 100,
7
It is not the aim of this paper to discuss in deep the pros and cons of these innovative proxies. For more
details, see, among others, Patel and Pavitt (1995).
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in 1980 R&D expenditure was 275, with the highest and the lowest values for Germany (359)
and for Italy (193) respectively. This period has been followed by the substantial stand{by
around an average of more or less 250 for the rst half of the `80s. Since then R&D has shown
a very substantial increase, reaching an average of 892 in 1992, with Germany and Great
Britain respectively as top (1294) and worst performer (639). Along the period considered
(1973{1992), the four countries have experienced an average compounded rate of growth equal
to 11.6%. Germany has the highest growth rate (13.7%), followed by Italy (11.3%), France
(10.8%), and Great Britain (9.7%).
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Figure 3: Quota of R&D in motor vehicles on total manufacturing production
Figure 3 shows the quota of motor vehicles R&D expenditure on total manufacturing pro-
duction from 1973 to 1991, while in Figure 4 the R&D intensity of the motor vehicles for the
four countries considered is shown.
The two gures show some interesting elements relative to the relationships among the two
building blocks of the automobile TS, which refer to the innovative and the production activities
respectively. Indeed, on the one hand, Figure 3 conrms what has been previously said with
regard to the marked dierences in the R&D expenditure patterns along time, while adding
some more information. The rst thing to emerge is a quite straightforward conrmation of the
diverging patterns in innovative activity as far as the input indicator is concerned. Germany
is well above the rest of the sample, Italy and Great Britain are characterised by very similar
13
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Figure 4: R&D intensity in the motor vehicles
patterns, and France is in an intermediate position. However, the trend in manufacturing
weighted R&D expenditure results to be less cyclical than that resulting from the consideration
of R&D expenditure alone, especially for Germany and France. This seems to point to the
fact that R&D expenditure appears to be linked to the necessities of the economy and thus its
cyclical variations are in some cases the result of cyclical variations in the economic performance.
A glance at Figure 4 further conrms this evidence, in particular for Germany and France,
with almost coincident and relatively steady patterns. The case of Great Britain and Italy is
quite dierent. Firstly, their R&D intenssity is lower along the whole period. Secondly, they
show more pronounced cyclical variations, hinting how the attention devoted to the automobile
sector, with respect to the others, is less structural than in Germany and France. More in
particular, Great Britain shows a worsening of its innovative intensity starting from the mid
`80s. Italy has a very pronounced peak, possibly due to cycles on the production side. On the
contrary, in the nal years of the period, the relative incidence of R&D increases to reach and
overcome that of France. The latter is the most relevant temporal change we observe, hinting
at an interesting case of eventual catching up, at least in terms of R&D intensity, of the Italian
automobile TS with respect to the others.
We now turn to the analysis of the output of the innovative activity, which is normally
assumed to be reected in the patenting activity. In order to depurate the analysis from
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Figure 5: Motor vehicles NRTA, ve years moving average
inevitable institutional dierences between the patent oÆces of the various countries, rst of
all, we will refer to the number of patents granted in the US Patents and Trademark OÆce
during the period 1977-1995 (USPTO, OEIP/TAF Database, 1996). Furthermore, to get rid
of scale eects, we will compute a Revealed Technological Advantages index (RTA), which is
nothing but a standard specialisation Balassa index based on patent counts. For the generic
sector k of country i, the indicator is thus dened as follows:
RTA
k
i
=
Pat
k
i
=
P
i
Pat
k
i
P
k
Pat
k
i
=
P
k
P
i
Pat
k
i
where Pat
k
i
denotes the patents granted to country i in sector k. This indicator has the usual
meaning. In fact, it indicates a certain degree of technological specialisation in sector k of
country i if it is greater than one, and technological despecialisation with respect to total
manufacturing if it is less than one.
Having no upper limit, this indicator can be normalised in a simple way:
NRTA
k
i
=
RTA
k
i
  1
RTA
k
i
+ 1
:
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Accordingly, country i turns out to be specialised in sector k if  1 < NRTA
k
i
< 0, while it is
despecialised if 0 < NRTA
k
i
< 1.
The analysis of Figure 5 shows quite clear patterns. Indeed, a rather evident diverging trend
in patenting emerges, suggesting an increasing level of polarisation in the innovative results of
the dierent TS. Germany is in fact the only country with positive and increasing values of the
NRTA for the whole period examined. On the opposite, the rest of the countries experience a
decline in their relative technological advantages, though with dierent intensity. France has
the steepest declining trend. Starting from positive values in 1977 (NRTA = 0.10), only slightly
lower than that of Germany (NRTA = 0.14), it ends up with a very wide gap. Great Britain
shows more or less the same pattern as France, but with a more pronounced decrease starting
from the mid `80s, and it ends up with the lowest NRTA value (-0.15) at the end of the period.
Italy has once more the most varied trajectory. In fact, it shows a cyclical upward trend that
lasts until the end of the `80s, peaking in 1988 to the positive value of 0.05. Then it starts
a mild decline until 1992, with positive values, followed by a steep decline that reaches the
absolute minimum at the end of the period in 1995 (RTA = -0.11).
In conclusion, three are the main evidences emerging from this analysis. First, the steady
increase of the motor vehicles technological comparative advantage of Germany, which there-
fore seems to have been the explicit target of its technological activity. Second, the irregular
but apparent increase in the automobile despecialisation of France and Great Britain, which
suggests a possible shift in their sectoral technological activity. Finally, the performance of
Great Britain and Italy, which appears to be more contrasted and in need of a more complete
kind of analysis in order to exhaust the whole spectrum of possible causes.
4.2 Innovative pervasivity and dependency
As in the case of the industry side, also for the innovative side a deeper analysis is carried out
with respect to relational kind of aspects.
A rst preliminary indicator of the techno{economic interrelationships within the automo-
bile TS can be considered that of the innovative pervasivity or dependency of the correspondent
economic sector. Indeed, similarly to the backward and forward linkages indicators, the perva-
sivity/dependency ones identify the role of a certain sector within a certain web of interactions,
but this time in innovative terms, by looking at intersectoral innovation rather than production
ows. Once again, the reference can be to either direct or total innovation ows, and the latter
can in turn be measured in dierent ways (Montresor, 1998). However, as we have argued else-
where (Leoncini et al., 1996), the analysis of innovation ows embodied into total production
ows, in turn activated by the nal demand, reveals the most consistent with the notion of TS
we consider. Accordingly, the same indicators will be built up on the basis of a matrix dened
as F = r^R, where r^ is the diagonal vector of the selected innovative proxy (in this case R&D
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expenditure), and R is dened as R = (x^)
 1
B
^
d, where
^
d is the diagonal vector of sectoral nal
demand.
As each element of F, f
ij
, measures the innovation produced by sector i and embodied in
the nal production of sector j, a rst absolute index of pervasivity/dependency (APD) can be
dened for sector k as:
APD
k
=
D
k
  I
k
A
k
  I
k
=
P
j
f
kj
  f
kk
P
i
f
ik
  f
kk
where D
k
are the innovative diusions of sector k (i.e. the row total of the innovation ows
matrix, F, for the same sector), A
k
the innovative acquisitions (i.e. the column total of F for
the same sector), while I
k
stands for the intrasectoral diusions of the sector itself, as from
the correspondent cell on the principal diagonal. Since we are interested only in intersectoral
relationships, such diusions will be left out, so that the numerator and the denominator denote,
respectively, net diusions and net acquisitions.
The meaning of the indicator is quite straightforward. If ADP
k
> 1, sector k is said to
be pervasive, that is, its intersectoral innovative acquisitions are less than its diusions. The
reverse holds if 0 < ADP
k
< 1, as sector k, in this case, depends on the rest of the economic
sectors for its innovative inputs more than the others depend on it.
Since the previous index has no upper ceiling, it can be normalised as follows:
NPD
k
=
APD
k
  1
APD
k
+ 1
:
In this way, k will turn out to be dependent if  1 < NPD
k
< 0, while it will be pervasive if
0 < NPD
k
< 1.
The two indexes are showed in Table 4 for comparable years with the previous ly calculated
indicators.
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Similarly to the industrial analysis, on which, to a certain extent, the innovative one is
based,
9
the data show that, as expected, the automobile sector is quite dependent for its
technological acquisitions on the rest of the economic sectors. In absolute terms, its innovative
diusions do not generally reach 10% of the corresponding acquisitions. This is particularly true
for France, where they are stable around 2%, while in Great Britain the innovative diusions
are as much as 10% of the acquisitions.
8
To be sure, as the data on sectoral R&D (DSTI (STAN, Anberd), 1994) are not available before 1973
on a comparable basis, the earlier years of the two indicators series do not coincide. The same holds for the
relative sectoral disaggregation. By matching I{O tables with R&D data we have in fact a less disaggregated
classication of 19 sectors (see Appendix A.2).
9
Let us remember that the innovative ows utilised to produce the ADP indicators are embodied in inter-
sectoral production ows.
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Table 4: Motor vehicles innovative pervasivity and dependency
France 1977 1980 1985 1990
Absolute 0.026 0.022 0.024 0.026
Normalised -0.950 -0.956 -0.953 -0.949
Germany 1978 1986 1988 1990
Absolute 0.070 0.074 0.072 0.078
Normalised -0.870 -0.862 -0.865 -0.855
G. Britain 1979 1984 1990
Absolute 0.049 0.095 0.157
Normalised -0.906 -0.827 -0.728
Italy 1985
Absolute 0.052
Normalised -0.901
Dierent patterns can however be identied by looking at the normalised values of the
indicator. France has the lowest and most stable values of the four countries, as the relevant
indicator decreases only slightly over time. Accordingly, the French motor vehicles sector reveals
the most structurally dependent of the four. The well known strength of this sector therefore
seems to rely on a substantial contribution of the other sectors, to whose identication we turn
in the next section.
For Germany also the normalised indicator shows a remarkable degree of stability over time,
but for higher values than those for France. Indeed, in relative terms the German motor vehicles
sector is the most pervasive (least dependent) of the four, contributing to explain the greater
connectivity of the correspondent national TS (Leoncini and Montresor, 1999b).
Italy has only one available year
10
which is quite low (-0.901). A very dependent nature
seems therefore to conrm the well{known backward innovative linkages which establish be-
tween the Italian monopolist of the sector and a dense network of specialised suppliers.
Finally, a very interesting pattern emerges for Great Britain, showing an appreaciable in-
crease over time of the normalised indicator. The sustained process of internationalisation,
which has characterised the sector along the `80s, seems therefore to have also made it more
internally pervasive.
Although quite instructive, the pervasivity/depencendy indicator is a synthetic one, as it
identies the role of a certain sector in the innovation relationships, rather than the relationships
10
The caveat for it are the same raised in the preceding paragraph.
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themselves. Hence, more details about the latter can be obtained by mapping the relevant
innovation ows, a task we will accomplish in the next section.
4.3 Network analysis
The application of quite standard network analysis techniques to the intersectoral innovation
ows matrices we have referred above (that is the F matrices) is quite helpful in analysing the
characteristic structure of a certain national TS (Leoncini and Montresor, 1999a). The same
holds true also for the sectoral TS in which the former can be disaggregated. Indeed, once
the intersectoral innovation ows have been properly normalised (i.e. transformed into relative
intersectoral innovative acquisitions
11
), and, in turn, dichotomised with respect to a certain
cut-o value (t

)
12
, the innovative centrality of a certain sector, k, can be worked out. Hence,
its innovative diusions and acquisitions can be mapped with respect to the other sectors.
As far as the centrality is concerned
13
, it measures how important a certain sector k is by
simply counting the number of sectors it `innovates' (outdegree centrality, ODC
k
) or by which
it is innovated (indegree centrality, IDC
k
):
ODC
k
=
X
j
f
d
kj
; IDC
k
=
X
i
f
d
ik
Let us observe that, at this stage, it is the number of innovative edges and not their specic
sectoral identity, which matters, an aspect that we will instead consider in what follows.
Table 5 shows the values of these two indicators for the automobile sector in the four
countries considered and for the available periods (see the previous section for information on
the data source). In order to make our analysis less dependent on the arbitrariness of the
threshold selection, three cut{o values have been chosen, referring to, respectively, nearly all
(greater than 0.1% of the total, i.e. t

= 0:001), `medium' (greater than 0.3%, i.e. t

= 0:003),
and `large' (greater than 0.5%, i.e. t

= 0:005) innovative ows.
11
This simply amounts to considering a matrix F

, dened as:
F

= F(
^
f )
 1
where
^
f is the diagonal vector of total sectoral innovative acquisitions, that is the sum by column of F.
12
As it is well known, this means transforming the elements of F

into 0s and 1s, according to a `greater than'
test such as the following:
f
d
ij
= 1 if f

ij
 t

; f
d
ij
= 0 else
where f

ij
and f
d
ij
are the generic elements of F

and of F

dichotomised (F
d
) respectively.
13
Out of the various formulations, in the following we will refer to the most simple, that is to the so called
`Freeman degree centrality' (Scott, 1991).
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Table 5: Motor vehicles Freeman's degree centrality
Cut{o values 0.005 0.003 0.001
In Out In Out In Out
France
1977 7 1 10 7 11 10
1980 6 1 10 5 11 9
1985 7 1 11 6 12 9
1990 7 1 9 7 11 10
Germany
1978 6 9 8 13 9 14
1986 7 10 8 13 9 16
1988 7 10 8 14 9 16
1990 6 10 8 14 9 16
Great Britain
1979 7 6 10 8 14 12
1984 7 6 8 8 12 12
1990 8 10 9 13 13 17
Italy
1985 5 2 6 2 9 10
A rst important observation is strictly related to those of the previous section. In gen-
eral, the indegree centrality values are greater than the outdegree ones, thus conrming the
dependent nature of the sector. However, this does not hold for Germany, where, for all the
ows we have retained, it is pervasive. To be sure, this kind of switches, with respect to the
aggregate analysis performed in the previous section, can also be found in other countries, but
they are more limited. In the case of Great Britain, for example, the sector turns from depen-
dent into pervasive, moving from the middle `80s to the early `90s, in particular with respect
to medium/large ows. This occurs in the case of Italy as well, but only when small ows
are retained. As we have previously said, the former result can be linked, to a certain extent,
to the internationalisation of the British automobile sector. In the case of Italy, instead, the
same switch seems to show how the consideration of those innovative interrelationships which
possibly involve also small suppliers, of both components and nal products, is able to change
the nature of the same sector quite substantially.
A second important observation concerns the dierent importance (i.e. centrality) that the
automobile sector reveals in the four countries for ows of dierent magnitude.
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As for the outdegree values, the German automobile sector is the most central with respect
to all the cut{o values and, what is more, with relatively less `drops' in cutting out small
and medium innovative acquisitions, that is, in moving from 0.001 to 0.005. Always from an
outward perspective, the British automobile sector is the second most central for all the cut{o
values, but, this time, the relative indicator decreases substantially in moving from 0.001 to
0.003, and less from 0.003 to 0.005: small size diusions therefore seem to be particular relevant
also in Great Britain. As far as France and Italy are concerned, the innovative diusions are
relatively less consistent. Furthermore, the changes we observe in increasing the magnitude
of the relevant threshold are much more consistent. In particular, in France the innovative
diusions of the motor vehicles which overcome the largest reference ow (i.e. 0.005) reach
one sector only, while, in Italy, it suÆces to leave out ows of medium dimension to conne its
pervasivity to two sectors only.
Substantially dierent results emerge from the analysis of the indegree centrality. At rst,
let us observe that the dierences between the four countries in the considered sector are less
evident than for the outdegree values, with the partial exception of the smallest of the cut{
o values (0.001). The `homogenising' eect of their input{output structures (caught by the
columns) seems therefore to weight more than the `dierentiating' eect entailed by their R&D
system (caught by the rows). Also the dierences we observe in moving between the cut{
o values appear generally less substantial than for the outdegree values. Acquisitions seem
therefore more homogeneous than diusions for the present cut{o values, as their critical
thresholds are possibly higher. Finally, also the rank of the countries is substantially dierent.
Apart from 0.003, with respect to which they are slightly dominated by France, the acquisitions
of the British automobile sector count more than in the other countries. This is particularly
true when nearly all the ows are considered (that is, for 0.001), while in retaining medium
and large ows the acquisitions reduce substantially. What we have previously observed in
aggregate terms, therefore, nds a conrmation only for a limited subset of innovation ows.
This is even more true for Italy, as the dependent nature of its automobile sector appears evident
only when ows of a certain magnitude are left out. The indegree centrality of the sector in
France and Germany is instead more stable across the cut{o values, and intermediate with
respect to that of Great Britain and Italy. As in aggregate terms, the French acquisitions are
more consistent than the German ones, although the consideration of large ows only entails a
certain homogenisation.
A last remark is due for the temporal changes we observe in the centrality indicators. To
be sure, in general, they are not so relevant, so that the automobile sector appears as much
central at the beginning as at the end of the considered period, in all countries and for all the
cut{o values.
In general terms, let us observe that, as we expected, the outdegree centrality is slightly
more variable than the indegree. Indeed, the incidence of R&D expenditure varies more than
21
the input{output structures along time. However, the temporal changes are relatively more
consistent when both small and large ows are considered, while the reference to large ows
only entails a greater degree of stability.
More specically, as we have already observed at aggregate level, the most consistent varia-
tions concern Great Britain, where the outdegree centrality of the automobile sector increases
substantially for all the cut{o values, in particular from 1984 to 1990. Furthermore, a part
from the large ows, also its indegree centrality progressively decreases along time. As for the
rest, if we except the outdegree `jumps' revealed by Germany, the centrality of the automobile
sector remains quite stable.
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Figure 6: Oriented graphs (1985, cut{o = 0.001)
If the previous analysis just refers to the number of innovative diusions and acquisitions
of the automobile sector, more qualitative considerations about their destination and origin
can be obtained by applying to F
d
another typical network analysis technique, that of the
oriented graphs. As it is well known, these are the simple graphical dual of the same matri-
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Figure 7: Oriented graphs (1985, cut{o = 0.003)
ces. Nevertheless, as they show the relevant sectors and innovation ows as nodes and edges,
respectively, these graphs allow us to better visualise the map of the interrelationships which
refer to a certain sector.
Figures 6-8 report, for the four countries of our sample, the automobile{based edges of
such oriented graphs, for the three cut{o values that have been selected, and with respect to
the middle `80s only. In other words, they visualise the linkages of the `automobile network',
a network that can be obtained by leaving out all those edges which do not originate from,
or converge to the motor vehicles sector. As far as the temporal choice is concerned, as we
have seen in the previous centrality analysis, the most apparent changes occur in considering
innovative ows of dierent magnitude, rather than the same kind of ows with respect to
dierent periods. Accordingly, the evaluation has been limited to the period with the most
numerous observations.
When nearly all the innovative ows are considered (t

= 0:001), the four graphs are quite
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Figure 8: Oriented graphs (1985, cut{o = 0.005)
similar (Figure 6). Indeed, the density of the automobile network | dened as the ratio
between the number of `actua'l and `potential' automobile based innovative ows | is in the
case of France and Italy only slightly lower than in Great Britain and Germany: that is, 0.061
and 0.055, versus 0.070 and 0.073.
14
As far as the ows direction is concerned, as expected, the automobile industry (Sector
16)
15
reveals in general purely `diusive' only with respect to the most traditional sectors of
14
The density of a certain sectoral network, i, with respect to a certain cut{o value, k, (DEN
i;k
), is dened
as:
DEN
i;k
=
n
i;k
n(n  1)
where n
i;k
is the number of edges greater than k, which come either from or to sector i, while n(n  1) are the
total potential intersectoral linkages, with n equal to the number of the sectors (in this case, 342 = 19  18).
15
For the sectoral disaggregation utilised here, see Appendix A2.
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the disaggregation (Sectors 1-4), and to the residual one (Sector 19). The only exception is
that of the textiles (Sector 2), from which it receives innovative ows above the threshold in
France, while it does not receive ows at all from it in Italy. As much expected is the fact that
the automobile sector is purely `acquisitive' with respect to the chemical (Sector 5) and the
energetic products (Sector 6) sectors. However, the underlying techno{economic relationships
become bijective with respect to the chemicals in Germany, thus providing us with a further
conrmation of the more interconnected nature of its national innovation system.
A similar `acquisitive' argument, this time for the external parts and the engines, also holds
with respect to non-ferrous metals (Sector 10) and electrical equipment (Sector 14), which
benet from substantial motor vehicles innovations only in Germany and, for the former, also
in Great Britain.
As far as the remaining sectors are concerned, the automobile industry establishes bijective
innovative relationships with nearly all those sectors which supply to it physical kind of artefacts
(Sectors 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12), with the exception of rubber and plastic (Sector 7), only diusive
in France, and of non metallic mineral products (Sector 8), only acquisitive in Italy. The
relationships with the suppliers of more `sophisticated' components, typically in the oÆce &
computing machinery sector (Sector 13), are instead purely acquisitive in France and Great
Britain, or even below the relative threshold in Germany and Italy.
Finally, the innovative relationships turn out in general quite rare with the other transport
equipment sectors (Sectors 15 and 17), and with the professional goods one (Sector 18). This
is particularly true for the aircraft sector (Sector 17), which is in general isolated from the
automobile one, with the only exception of Great Britain, while the professional goods sector
(Sector 18) develops biunivocal relationships with the motor vehicles only in Germany.
The comparison between the graphs of the automobile network shows greater elements of
dierentiation when only medium and large innovative ows are retained (t

= 0:003). In fact,
Great Britain (with a density value of 0.046) and, above all, Italy (with DEN
0:03
= 0:023),
appear now less articulated than France (DEN
0:03
= 0:049) and Germany (DEN
0:03
= 0:064),
showing the most connected network (Figure 7).
As far as the map of the linkages is concerned, let us observe that those sectors which
make the motor vehicles less central in terms of outdegree in Great Britain and, in particular,
in Italy, are some of the most traditional, the residual (Sector 19) and the professional goods
sector (Sector 18). Indeed, these sectors remain the `target' of substantial automobile innovative
ows only in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France. Secondly, although apparently similar
in their higher density, the automobile networks of France and Germany are now more diverse.
In particular, much of the biunivocal relationships established in Germany with the suppliers of
physical artefacts (Sectors 7{12) turn in France into purely acquisitive, with the only exception
of the non-metallic mineral products (Sector 8). When only ows of an appreciable magnitude
are considered, the energetic products sector (Sector 6) gets totally disconnected from the
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automobile one, while the same occurs also for the non-ferrous metals (Sector 10), but in Italy
only. That the relationships between these two sectors are in the Italian system of innovation
substantially aected by small innovation and production ows therefore emerges once more
here and more precisely.
When only large innovation ows are considered (t

= 0:005), the density gap between the
German and the other automobile TS becomes more apparent (Figure 8). The percentage of
actual innovative linkages is, in the rst case, of nearly 5% of the total, while it is around
4% in Great Britain (DEN
0:05
= 0:038), and 2% in France and Italy (DEN
0:05
= 0:023 and
DEN
0:05
= 0:020, respectively).
More precisely, the only innovative ows that survive the dichotomisation in France and in
Italy refer to some of the sectors of the central part of the disaggregation (Sectors 7, 9, 11),
to which it adds the professional good sector (Sector 18) in France. Furthermore, a part from
the non-metallic mineral products (Sector 8), these relationships are all univocal and identify
innovative transfers towards the motor vehicles sector. The same kind of univocal relationships
can be also identied in Great Britain, where `large' diusions can however still be identied
from the automobile sector to food & beverages (Sector 1) and to textiles (Sector 2).
Conrming what can be observed by looking at all the innovative interrelationships (Leoncini
and Montresor, 1999b), the German automobile network is by far the most dense. On the one
hand, the only sectors which fall out of the network are the energetic products (Sector 6) and
the aircraft sector (Sectors 17) as in the other countries, the professional goods sector (Sector
18) as in Great Britain and Italy, and the oÆce & computing industry as in Italy. On the other
hand, much of the suppliers of the relevant physical components receive substantial innovative
ows from the automobile sector.
5 The international side
The relationships we have considered in the previous paragraphs are exclusively internal. In
other words, we have focus our attention on those production and innovation interactions
that the automobile TS establishes within the country where the relative companies reside.
However, as we have said at the beginning, the sectoral TS extends also outside the country of
their home{base, and through dierent material and immaterial exchanges.
Among the other, trade ows and foreign direct investments represent two channels whose
analysis can be useful in disentangling the actual degree of internationalisation (trade) and
transnationalisation (FDI) of the automobile TS. To these ows we now turn our attention.
26
Table 6: Motor vehicles bilateral revealed comparative advantages
EU USA Japan Brazil Check Sing. China OECD Non
Rep. OECD
1975 France 1.64 0.31 0.32 0.34 3.03 1.20 2.27 1.08 1.21
Germany 1.33 1.44 3.35 1.14 0.78 2.19 0.14 1.10 1.49
G. Britain 1.11 0.50 1.04 0.91 1.20 2.50 0.42 0.81 1.21
Italy 1.06 0.76 0.95 0.67 2.02 1.64 2.54 0.82 0.95
1980 France 1.50 0.45 0.47 0.38 2.11 0.46 1.58 1.10 1.18
Germany 1.48 1.49 5.82 1.23 1.10 1.94 1.30 1.30 1.41
G. Britain 0.88 0.38 1.67 2.30 1.53 1.39 0.20 0.66 1.09
Italy 0.84 0.47 1.12 2.55 2.00 1.16 0.25 0.67 0.78
1985 France 1.30 0.31 0.30 1.36 0.75 0.48 0.67 0.74 1.23
Germany 1.55 1.31 6.52 1.38 1.15 2.12 0.56 1.15 1.46
G. Britain 0.64 0.32 0.81 1.37 0.82 1.43 0.59 0.43 0.81
Italy 0.70 0.15 0.66 1.48 1.65 2.90 0.48 0.40 0.64
1990 France 1.25 0.26 0.71 2.39 2.20 0.59 1.22 0.94 1.20
Germany 1.42 1.09 4.38 1.42 1.32 2.56 2.61 1.26 1.35
G. Britain 0.85 0.36 1.21 2.14 0.52 1.32 0.74 0.66 0.69
Italy 0.76 0.24 0.52 1.37 0.80 2.07 0.19 0.58 0.60
1993 France 1.23 0.23 0.36 0.56 1.06 0.44 1.72 0.88 0.91
Germany 1.38 0.94 4.26 1.21 1.08 3.37 1.97 1.17 1.40
G. Britain 0.92 0.28 1.17 0.95 0.48 1.64 0.91 0.66 0.56
Italy 0.64 0.16 0.59 2.04 0.96 1.47 0.28 0.47 0.59
5.1 Bilateral revealed comparative advantages
As it is well known, one of the most common index for analysing the sectoral structure of the
international relationships of one country is the Balassa index of revealed comparative advan-
tages. However, we are also interested in mapping the degree of specialisation/despecialisation
with respect to specic countries/regions. Such a combined analysis of sectoral specialisa-
tion/despecialisation and bilateral relations can be carried out with respect to trade ows, and
reveals quite useful in determining the actual degree of international extension of the corre-
spondent TS. In order to perform this analysis, in the following we work out for the automobile
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sector a Bilateral Revealed Comparative Advantages indicator (BRCA), dened as follows:
BRCA
j
i;k
=
Exp
j
i;k
=
P
i
Exp
j
i;k
P
k
Exp
j
i;k
=
P
k
P
i
Exp
j
i;k
where Exp
j
i;k
denotes the export made by country i in sector k to country j. In other words,
the BRCA is nothing but the ratio between the sectoral and the total export shares of a certain
origin country i to a destination country j.
As for the standard RCA, the meaning of this indicator depends on its values being greater
or lower than one. In the former case, it shows a revealed bilateral comparative advantage, that
is, the exports of the automobile sector perform better than those of the rest of the industrial
sectors in a certain country. Hence, we have a relative specialisation in this sector, but with
respect to a specic geographical area. The opposite holds for values less than one, which
indicate a relative despecialisation in automobile manufacturing with respect to a certain area.
Therefore, the reference to bilateral, rather than to standard RCA allows us to map geo-
graphically the relative strength of a certain country in the automobile sector. We are thus
able to compare the dierent spatial patterns of internationalisation that the relative TS has
undergone, at least by allocating the national production abroad.
As far as the calculations are concerned, the reference years have been chosen in order to
work out the BRCA indicator for the same periods of the previous indicators (Table 6).
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As for
the destination countries, they have been chosen in order to give an account of the automobile
international specialisation in the main world markets, both established, such as the EU, USA
and Japan, and emerging, such as South Eastern and South Western Asia (Singapore and
China) and Latin America (Brazil), although we are aware that this choice may lead to some
distorted results.
The results we have obtained with respect to the European market conrm our expectations
to a certain extent. France and Germany are the only countries, out of the four, with a persistent
specialisation in this area. Furthermore, the recent expansion of the mergers and acquisition
activities of the German car producers seems to be conrmed by the shift we observed in the
magnitude of the BRCA indexes from France, which has the highest values until the early `80s,
to Germany, which, although following a decreasing pattern, overcome France from then on.
The comparative advantages initially revealed by Great Britain and Italy turn into a progressive
disadvantage in the early `80s, partially recovered by Great Britain only, in the most recent
period. Also in this case, the pattern in the BRCA of the two countries is decreasing, insofar
suggesting the penetration of other car producers in Europe (notably from the Far East).
16
The data on trade ows are taken from the OECD STAN database on Bilateral Trade (DSTI (STAN,
Bilateral Trade Database), 1997).
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Moreover, it also emerges that Great Britain and Italy might have shifted their specialisation
area, rather than competing with France and Germany in the same market. A suggestive
example is given by the case of the Brazilian market, in which, since the early `80s, both Italy
and Great Britain acquire specialisation which are greater than, or at least comparable with,
those of France and Germany. A similar argument seems to hold for the case of Singapore,
where Italy and Great Britain are however still dominated by Germany.
Germany appears the only competitive car producer of the four in the USA, although with
a decreasing trend, and, more evidently, in Japan, where Great Britain only reveals a certain
degree of specialisation. Furthermore, in the most recent period, Germany also overcomes the
previously unique and consistent specialisation of France in the Chinese market.
A last specic remark concerns the Eastern market, here represented by the Check Republic.
Here as well, a certain change emerges which conrms the increasing internationalisation of the
German car producers. Until the early `80s, France and Italy revealed the most competitive
producers in that area. However, entering the globalization phase, Italy looses its comparative
advantages, apparently at the expenses of Germany, which joins France as the only specialised
country in the Check Republic.
5.2 Foreign Direct Investments
As it is generally argued, one characteristic of the globalization process is that the volume of
foreign direct investments (FDI) has been increasing more than exports as a means of interna-
tional integration (OECD, 1992, Ch. 10). Indeed, by establishing production and innovation
units abroad, rms have turned from purely international to transnational, if not even global.
This is true, in particular, for the motor vehicles sector, for which the geographical dispersion
of the subsidiaries of a certain parent company around the world is becoming so widespread
that, in some cases, the actual nationality of an automobile transnational corporations (TNC)
could not be determined on the basis of a purely territorial criterion. A certain conrmation
of this fact can be obtained by looking at the largest transnational corporations (abroad) and
foreign aÆliates (in the host economy) of the four countries analysed, in terms of sales (Table
7).
First of all, rms operating in the motor vehicles sector are the biggest transnational cor-
porations in three out of the four countries examined, where these rms rank in the rst three
positions apart from one case (Germany). As far as the foreign penetration in these countries
is concerned, again, the dimension of the automobile foreign aÆliates is quite big, with the only
exception of Italy. However, it is Italian the only non{USA foreign aÆliate (in France).
By combining the two previous bits of analysis, a certain level of dierentiation seems
to emerge among two groups of countries: France and Germany, on the one hand, and Great
Britain and Italy, on the other. Indeed, the former group seems to be characterised by a certain
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Table 7: Ranking of motor vehicles companies among the 10 largest TNC and
among the largest foreign aÆliates by sales (1988)
Largest transnational corporations abroad
Company (Rank) Sales (mil US$)
France Regie Nationale des Usines Renault S.A. (1) 10,313.7
Peugeot S.A. (2) 23,242.3
Germany Daimler Benz AG (1) 41,848.2
Volkswagen AG (3) 33,720.5
BMW AG (10) 13,931.5
G. Britain . . . . . .
Italy Fiat S.p.a. (1) 37,812.1
Largest foreign aÆliates in host economy
Company (Rank) Home economy Sales (mil US$)
France Fiat France (4) Italy 4,237.6
Germany Ford-Werke AG (1) USA 10,959.3
Adam Opel AG (2) USA 9,942.9
G. Britain Ford Motor Co. Ltd (1) USA 10,559.1
Vauxhall Motors Ltd. (7) USA 3,477.6
Italy . . . . . . . . .
Source: UNCTAD (1993).
balance between the presence abroad and that at home of automobile TNC. Great Britain and
Italy, instead, have very unbalanced, although opposite, characterisations (inward in one case,
outward in the other). This seems to be a clear consequence, for Italy, of the monopolistic
position of its only national producer, which makes the penetration of foreign producers more
diÆcult, and for Great Britain, on the contrary, the result of the progressive lost of a `true'
national champion.
Similarly to the case of exports, also with respect to FDI, it is interesting to establish
if the motor vehicles sector is one in which a country reveals a comparative advantage or
disadvantage. Indeed, the motor vehicles sector is not necessarily the largest recipient one of
the four countries. To be sure, this is only true for Italy and Germany, but only as far as
outward FDI are concerned (UNCTAD, 1993).
As for exports and patents, also with respect to outward FDI, a revealed comparative
advantage in sector j for the transnational activities of country i (RTNA) can be calculated, in
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1
leadership along the decade is the result of a more general trend. Indeed, the relative weight
of the transnational activities of the automobile TS decreases in general from the early `80s,
possibly because of the extension of the transnational activities of the other manufacturing
sectors.
Coming now to the inward FDI stocks, their incidence on manufacturing is the highest in
Italy and Great Britain (around 8%) in the early `80s, with a consistent gap with respect to
Germany (about 4%). Following the decrease undergone by the sector also in inward terms,
the rank appears quite dierent in the early `90s. In fact, with the exception of France (where
it has a very low weight, less than 1%), Italy and Great Britain are joined by Germany around
a share of 3{4% of all the manufacturing inward stocks.
As a result of these temporal changes, Italy, which experiences the biggest drop in both
types of FDI, shows a structural kind of change, turning from a net exporter to a net recipient.
The decrease is less consistent for the inward FDI of Germany, which appears to be the only
country of the group that, although structurally a net exporter, successfully managed to remain
`palatable' to foreign investors. A positive balance is also shown by France, while Great Britain,
in spite of the above mentioned changes, remains a net recipient along the decade.
Table 8: Motor vehicles revealed transnational advantages
Early 80's Early 90s
absolute symmetric absolute symmetric
France . . . . . . 0.78 -0.12
Germany 1.74 0.27 1.61 0.23
G. Britain 0.46 -0.37 0.33 -051
Italy 2.52 0.43 0.81 -0.10
Although quite interesting, and more or less well known, the results we have just presented
suers from a limitation, as they do not consider the dierent scale of the FDI activities of the
various countries. For this reason, in order to obtain more signicant results, it is opportune to
normalise the previous indicator with respect to the relative weight of the World FDI outward
stock in the motor vehicles sector, that is, the denominator of the previous equation. In so
doing, a proper revealed transnational advantages/disadvantages indicator can be obtained,
whose meaning is the same of the previous ones: values greater than one (or positive, if the
indicator is symmetric) denote that country i has a transnational specialisation in sector j (in
this case the automobile sector), while the reverse holds for values between 0 and 1 (or negative,
in the symmetric version).
Unfortunately, the data to obtain the denominator of the RTNA are diÆcult to obtain. As
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data on both the automobile and the total outward FDI stocks are not available for all the
World countries, and for the same periods, a `second best' solution is to work out the speciali-
sation/despecialisation index with respect to a more circumscribed area (the OECD countries)
and to wide temporal references (such as the early '80s and the early '90s), encompassing years
that, although not coincident, are close enough between them.
18
With these caveats in mind,
the RTNA indicators in the automobile sector of the four countries of our sample are reported
in Table 8.
Quite dierently from the previous gures, the computation of the RTNA indicators shows
a more composite picture. In the rst period, Italy is the most specialised country in the
automobile sector. However, it experiences a very sharp drop in the early `90s, when it is
overcome by Germany, for which, in turn, the indicator remains more or less stable, suggesting
a persistent specialisation. To be sure, Italy is the only country for which, again, a structural
change occurs, from specialised to slightly despecialised. This is certainly due to the very low
level of the denominator of the RTNA formula, and thus simply expresses the irrelevance of the
rest of the economic sectors with respect to the automobile sector, in terms of FDI. Therefore,
the large decrease of the indicator seems to be due more to the internationalisation of the Italian
economy as a whole, rather than to an absolute weakening of the automobile sector.
Great Britain, as expected, has the lowest values, and is the only despecialised country in
the early `80s. France, for which data are available for the last period only, is characterised by
a despecialisation with values almost equal to those of Italy, but with an underlying structure
of the FDI completely dierent.
6 Conclusions
In this paper the structure of the automobile industry has been analysed from a system perspec-
tive. Given the importance of the techno-economic interrelationships which establish between
this and other sectors, both inside and outside a certain economy, the concept of technological
system has been used as unit of analysis to investigate the innovative process of the motor
vehicles.
By examining the characteristics of both production and innovation ows, both intersectoral
and international, we have tried to determine the extension and the most important features
of the automobile TS of the four biggest European markets (i.e. France, Germany, Italy and
Great Britain) in the last decade.
18
To be sure, the World of reference we have retained for our calculations is a subset of the OECD countries.
However, the countries for which data are not available are presumably not very important in terms of outward
FDI.
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As the aspects we have addressed are quite numerous, and have been examined by using a
set of heterogeneous analytical instruments (such as input-output theory, network techniques,
specialisation analysis), the results we have obtained are manifold and diÆcult to be exhaus-
tively synthesised. Some important conclusions can however be drawn.
The rst set of conclusions refer to the importance of the sectoral TS as the unit of analysis.
Indeed, fresh insights can be brought into the study of a very traditional industry such as the
automobile industry.
Firstly, we have detected a very high degree of stability in the face of change. The various
TS examined managed, more or less successfully, to maintain their stability by means of a
high level of internal change. In fact, in front of an overall stability of the usual industrial
indicators, our dierent levels of analysis have detected a sustained process of change in the
various elements of the automobile TS, all of which contributed to a relatively steady path of
development.
Secondly, `scale eects' are very much evident for TS rather than for single producers. In
this sense, notions such as \reverse salient" (Hughes, 1989) and \functional failures"(Constant,
1980) appear to be appropriate in the description of what has going on in the automobile
industry in the decade we have examined.
Thirdly, the TS dynamics we have observed, are more varied and characterised by a high
degree of structural change, than that characterising the single TS units. As we have noted,
dynamic eects are very diversied. Dierent parts of the TS, with dierent relative dimension
and weight, have undergone substantial changes along time. These changes were dierent among
the various TS, but also, when they were more or less similar, the result was by any mean the
same. Indeed, some of them were subject to structural change forced by the underlying process
of diused technological change, while for others the globalization played an important role,
while, nally, for others it was the institutional change to trigger the evolution of the TS. For
all the combination of the three was surely never the same.
Coming now to more detailed aspects, the following points are worth stressing again.
First of all, when internal techno-economic relationships are considered, the automobile
industry shows some general sectoral properties (such as dominant backward linkages and
innovative dependence) that hold in all the countries of our sample. However, the same charac-
teristics apply to the four countries to a dierent extent, thus suggesting how the institutional
set-up, within which a certain industry operates, might works as a dierentiating element. For
example, the French automobile industry relies on external innovations much more than the
German one, whose pervasivity in turn contributes to make its national innovation system more
connected. Further dierences emerge when the specic nature of the techno-economic ows
is analysed in more detail. In the case of Italy, for example, the automobile sector reveals an
innovative dependent sector, unless innovation ows of small dimension are also considered,
insofar catching the dense network of relationships which establish with small size specialised
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supplier rms. When both small and large innovative ows are considered, instead, the Italian
sector turns out pervasive, while the German automobile TS becomes the only one which gets
innovations from traditional kind of sectors for ows of large magnitude.
Secondly, temporal aspects are also very relevant in analysing (internal) intersectoral re-
lationships. Indeed, along the retained period, apparent divergence phenomena can be found
by looking at proper innovative indicators. The progressive increase of the (total manufac-
turing weighted) R&D expenditure, and of the revealed (by patents) technological advantage
of the German motor vehicles, as opposed to, respectively, a less substantial increase and a
decrease in France and Great Britain, is the most relevant example. Although cyclical factors
also intervene in explaining these results, as it is apparently shown by the irregular trends of
the Italian TS, more structural kind of changes can also be detected. A signicant example is
provided by the British motor vehicles, with respect to which the well-know recent pattern of
internationalisation has brought a very substantial decrease of its production backward linkages
and of its innovative dependence. In this case therefore, it is the evolution undergone by the
relative innovation system in a climate of globalization to have entailed a change in the sectoral
characteristics of the automobile industry.
Finally, interesting results have been also obtained by looking at the international relation-
ships of the automobile TS. As far as export ows are concerned, a part from the uncontested
dominance of France and Germany on the European market, the countries considered reveal
dierent patterns of specialisation in dierent geographical areas. In spite of some recent
changes, the Italian automobile industry, for example, appears relatively more successful in
the penetration of developing countries, while Germany reveals more specialised in Japan and
USA.
A similar argument holds when foreign direct investments are considered. On the one hand,
automobile companies are among the most multinationalised in all of our countries, both in
terms of transnational subsidiaries abroad and of hosted foreign aÆliates. On the other hand,
inward FDI are more relevant than the outward in some countries (such as Great Britain),
while the reverse holds in some other (for example, Germany). Country specic eects can
also be identied by looking at the temporal changes of both inward and outward FDI, which
are in general decreasing from the early `80s to the early `90s. Hence, for example, the sign of
the FDI balance, and of the relative outward specialisation, changes signicantly in the case of
Italy, which turns from a net exporter to a net FDI recipient.
Although many other important aspects have been left out from the analysis, which could
therefore be integrated in several respects (in particular organisational), the results obtained
are quite interesting. Indeed, they suggest how the relational and contextual elements which are
caught by the notion of technological system are among the factors which explain the dierent
national performances of the European automobile industry. In other words, the automobile
technological system reveals properties that, although idiosyncratic, induce dierent innovative
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outcomes, depending on their matching with dierent institutional set-ups, which are sectoral
but also, and especially, national. Dierent systemic approaches should therefore be considered
as complementary, rather than substitute or even contrasting.
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Appendix
A.1: Backward/Forward Linkages indicators: sectoral
disaggregation
1 Agriculture, forestry & shing 16 Electrical apparatus, nec (incl TV)
2 Mining & quarrying 17 Shipbuilding & repairing (incl Other)
3 Food, beverages & tobacco 18 Motor vehicles
4 Textiles, apparel & leather 19 Aircraft
5 Wood products & furniture 20 Professional goods
6 Paper, paper products & printing 21 Other manufacturing
7 Industrial chemicals (incl drugs) 22 Electricity, gas & water
8 Petroleum & coal products 23 Construction
9 Rubber & plastic products 24 Wholesale & retail trade
10 Non-metallic mineral products 25 Restaurants & hotels
11 Iron & steel 26 Transport & storage
12 Non-ferrous metals 27 Communication
13 Metal products 28 Finance & insurance
14 Non-electrical machinery 29 Community, social & personal services
15 OÆce & computing machinery 30 Producers of government services
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A.2: Pervasivity/Dependency and Network indicators: sectoral
disaggregation
1 Food, beverages & tobacco 11 Metal products
2 Textiles, apparel & leather 12 Non-electrical machinery
3 Wood products & furniture 13 OÆce & computing machinery
4 Paper, paper products & printing 14 Electrical apparatus, nec (incl TV)
5 Industrial chemicals (incl. Drugs) 15 Shipbuilding & repairing (incl Other)
6 Petroleum & coal products 16 Motor vehicles
7 Rubber & plastic products 17 Aircraft
8 Non-metallic mineral products 18 Professional goods
9 Iron & steel 19 Other manufacturing
10 Non-ferrous metals
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